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LAWFARE AND THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION: WHAT THE SOVIET 
UNION AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION CAN TEACH US 
Christi Scott Bartman, MPA, JD, PhD* 
One might ask why the Soviet Union so adamantly promoted a defi-
nition of aggression and aggressive war while, as many have noted, con-
ducting military actions that appeared to violate the very definition they 
espoused in international treaties and conventions. Using treaties, the So-
viet Union and Russian Federation practiced a program of lawfare long 
before the term became known. “Lawfare,” as used by the Soviet Union and 
Russian Federation, is the manipulation or exploitation of the international 
legal system to supplement military and political objectives legally, politi-
cally, and equally as important, through the use of propaganda. Lawfare 
was not the sole domain of the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation. 
What makes the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation stand out is their 
use of lawfare earlier and with a greater degree of consistent strategic im-
plementation than others. They also continued to operate on a dual front, 
both legally in international bodies and through international law, and ille-
gally or quasi-legally, when they manipulated the system to supplement 
their military agenda. With a consistent definition of aggression and ag-
gressive war in place, a degree of predictability could be achieved in regard 
to future actions of other states and international bodies such as the United 
Nations. The Soviet Union proves the perfect case study to demonstrate the 
use of lawfare. The Council on Foreign Relations claimed lawfare was a 
“somewhat of a new phenomenon, the full effects of its application are yet 
unknown.‖1 I argue that this is not a somewhat new phenomenon and has 
been practiced by the Soviet Union for decades. In order to preclude further 
actions, such as the ones demonstrated by the Soviet Union time and again, 
  
 *      Dr. Bartman is currently an Instructor of Public Law/Judicial Process in the Political 
Science Department at Bowling Green State University. She also teaches International Rela-
tions, Western Political Thought, and European Politics. Her research asks why the Soviet 
Union so adamantly promoted the definition of aggression and aggressive war while, as 
many have noted, conducting military actions that appeared to violate the very definition 
they espoused in international treaties and conventions. Her recently published work, 
LAWFARE: USE OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSIVE WAR BY THE SOVIET AND RUSSIAN 
GOVERNMENTS, demonstrates that through the use of treaties and propaganda the Soviet 
Union and Russian Federation practiced a program of ―lawfare‖ long before the term became 
known. 
 1 Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 18, 2003), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/5772/lawfare_the_latest_in_asymmetries.html. 
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enforcement will be the key. Without solid enforcement mechanisms, this 
case study is only a demonstration of the weakness of the system. The les-
sons learned from the Soviet experience of the use of the definition of ag-
gression as a form of lawfare should be considered by all as the discussions 
continue on the application and the execution of the definition. And, as for 
the concept of lawfare as applied through the use of the definition of ag-
gression, one need only look to the Soviet Union to see the successful use of 
an old concept with a new name. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 424 
II. LAWFARE BACKGROUND ..................................................................... 426 
A.  The Soviet Era ............................................................................... 428 
B.  The Russian Federation Era .......................................................... 442 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 11, 2010, the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 
which was held in Kampala, Uganda between May 31 and June 11, 2010, 
adopted, by consensus, amendments to the Rome Statute that defined the 
crime of aggression. Article 8, which contains the most relevant text, states: 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, ―crime of aggression‖ means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position ef-
fectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, ―act of aggression‖ means the 
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regard-
less of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an 
act of aggression: 
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the ter-
ritory of  another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, 
resulting  from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of 
force of the  territory of another State or part thereof; 
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territo-
ry of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory 
of another State; 
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed 
forces of  another State; 
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
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e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the terri-
tory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contra-
vention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of 
their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has 
placed at the  disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for 
perpetrating an  act of aggression against a third State; 
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars  or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State  of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its 
substantial  involvement therein.2 
  Most do not realize, however, that the Soviet Union was the stan-
dard bearer for this definition. The wording is almost a verbatim transcript 
of the July 3, 1933 Convention on the Definition of Aggression signed by 
the Soviet Union, Romania, Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, 
and Turkey. One might ask why the Soviet Union so adamantly promoted a 
definition of aggression and aggressive war while, as many have noted, 
conducting military actions that appeared to violate the very definition they 
espoused in international treaties and conventions. Using treaties, the Soviet 
Union and Russian Federation practiced a program of lawfare long before 
the term became known. ―Lawfare,‖ as used by the Soviet Union and Rus-
sian Federation, is the manipulation or exploitation of the international legal 
system to supplement military and political objectives legally, politically, 
and equally as important, through the use of propaganda.  
Lawfare was not the sole domain of the Soviet Union or the Russian 
Federation. What makes the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation stand 
out is their use of lawfare earlier and with a greater degree of consistent 
strategic implementation than others. They also continued to operate on a 
dual front, both legally in international bodies and through international 
law, and illegally or quasi-legally, when they manipulated the system to 
supplement their military agenda. With a consistent definition of aggression 
and aggressive war in place, a degree of predictability could be achieved in 
regard to future actions of other states and international bodies such as the 
United Nations. 
The strategic implementation of non-aggression treaties to set the 
stage for future military action by the Red Army or to restrict action from 
other armies was practiced repeatedly by the Soviet Union with states such 
as Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and others. Preconceived binding of 
other countries, such as those of the Warsaw Pact,  enabled the Soviet Un-
ion to intervene militarily and at least auspiciously, claim it was in adhe-
  
 2 Int‘l Criminal Court [ICC], The Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. RC/Res. 6. (June 16, 
2010). 
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rence to international law and treaty obligations. This demonstrated the do-
minion the Soviet Union had over the use of lawfare as a true supplement to 
military action. Scenarios such as the use of the definition of aggression and 
aggressive war by the jurists at Nuremberg and continuing propagation be-
fore international bodies such as the United Nations were not, taken by 
themselves, uses of lawfare. They were examples of strategic employment, 
within a legal context, to set the stage for their use later to supplement mili-
tary strategy. No state was more consistent in this dual application than the 
Soviet Union, and later, the Russian Federation. 
The combination of lawfare with propaganda or media manipula-
tion was also perfected by the Soviet Union as evidenced in both Korea and 
the Vietnam War. Since the definition includes manipulation of the interna-
tional legal system for both political and military objectives, it is possible to 
utilize the international legal system for political purposes not associated 
with imminent or future deployment of troops.  
The Soviet Union proves the perfect case study to demonstrate the 
use of lawfare. The Council on Foreign Relations claimed lawfare was a 
―somewhat of a new phenomenon, the full effects of its application are yet 
unknown.‖3 I argue that this is not a somewhat new phenomenon and has 
been practiced by the Soviet Union for decades, only under the auspices of 
aggression and crimes against peace rather than humanitarian law. To dem-
onstrate, I begin with a short background on the term lawfare. This is fol-
lowed by the primary focus of the article, the Soviet era. Ample evidence is 
presented that the concept, if not the terminology, was in use by the Soviet 
Union long before the term became known. Finally, a short update on the 
current use of the definition of aggression by the Russian Federation, its 
incorporation into Russian Criminal Law, and the new emphasis on humani-
tarian law is put forth. This article will demonstrate that without a solid en-
forcement mechanism, in this case for those that commit aggressive war, the 
use of lawfare is likely to continue despite the consensus definition.  
II.   LAWFARE BACKGROUND 
The first use of the term ―lawfare‖ is attributed to John Carlson and 
Neville Yeomans in ―Whither Goeth the Law—Humanity or Barbarity.‖ 
While examining the demise and re-emergence of humanitarian law, they 
concluded, ―[l]awfare replaces warfare and the duel is with words rather 
than swords.‖4 The concept was recently picked up by the U.S. military as 
  
 3 Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 18, 2003), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/5772/lawfare_the_latest_in_asymmetries.html. 
 4 John Carlson & Neville Yeomans, Whither Goeth the Law - Humanity or Barbarity, in 
THE WAY OUT - RADICAL ALTERNATIVES IN AUSTRALIA (Margaret Smith & David John 
Crossley eds., Lansdowne Press 1975), available at http://www.laceweb.org.au/whi.htm.   
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one of the greatest potential threats against the United States.5 Colonel 
Charles J. Dunlap Jr. clarified the term as the use of law as a weapon of 
war.6 Dunlap placed the argument in the context of the use of humanitarian 
law, or his preference, the law of armed conflict, against the United States. 
This angle has been pursued further by the Council on Foreign Relations, 
which defined ―lawfare,‖ and specifically its use as an asymmetrical wea-
pon, as ―a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional 
military means to achieve military objectives.‖7  
Professors Chadwick Austin and Antony Barone Kolenc  examined 
this concept further, applying it directly to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). For their purposes, they defined ―lawfare‖ as ―exploiting judicial 
processes to achieve political or military objectives.‖8 They focused on 
asymmetric methods used by others to exploit the ICC in relation to the 
United States, specifically, misusing the investigative process, filing ques-
tionable or fraudulent complaints, and manipulating the mass media.9  
The media was often used, either legitimately or illegitimately, to 
propose to the public that a state was fighting illegally or immorally and to 
damage the public support needed to wage war. Although frequently called 
―media warfare‖ by Austin and Kolenc, it was also mentioned in the Chi-
nese book Unrestricted Warfare.10 The authors, two Chinese People‘s Libe-
ration Army colonels, explained that use of alternative forms of warfare by 
a weaker country against a stronger one amounted to asymmetric warfare. 
They concluded about asymmetry, ―of all rules, this is the only one which 
encourages people to break rules so as to use rules.‖11 Use of the media, 
  
 5 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Val-
ues in 21st Conflicts 5 (2001), (unpublished working paper on file with the Harvard Kennedy 
School, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy) http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20 
Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf; See also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., 
Lawfare amid Warfare, THE WASH. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at A19(focusing on the use of 
lawfare by international groups claiming violations of humanitarian law by the United 
States). 
 6 Id. 
 7 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2; see also RADHIKA WITHANA, POWER, 
POLITICS, LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE BEHAVIOUR DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISES 
(2008) (looking at the relationship between international law and state behavior when an 
international crisis involves the threat or use of force, suggesting that the influence of inter-
national law on state behavior involving the possibility of the use of force plays a decisive 
role). 
 8 W. Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone Kolenc, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? The 
International Criminal Court as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L 
L. 291 (2006).  
 9 Id at 291–92. 
 10 See QIAO LIANG AND WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE (Pan Am. Publ‘g Co. 
2002) (1999).   
 11 Id. at 212. 
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however, is simply a prominent part of old-fashioned propaganda, which 
arguably was perfected by the Soviet Union.  
Propaganda, for our purposes, is ―the attempt to transmit social and 
political values in the hope of affecting people‘s thinking, emotions, and 
thereby behavior.‖12 My discussion of propaganda is limited to its use by 
the Soviet Union to proliferate the concept of lawfare as it relates to aggres-
sion and aggressive war.   
The key to lawfare is its use in a manipulative or exploitive fashion. 
Simply utilizing the international legal system to enforce valid laws would 
also not be considered lawfare for my purposes. The article by Dunlap and 
the transcript from the Council on Foreign Relations both seem to express 
the greatest concern for valid legal claims of a humanitarian nature brought 
by a state or even a few individuals that could undercut American objec-
tives. The state that claims the United States violated international law un-
der a given valid circumstance would be making a legal claim, therefore not 
manipulating the system, but simply seeking redress for a legal wrong.13 
Although there may be political motives, this does not reach the level of 
lawfare used by the Soviet Union and Russian Federation. They do not 
demonstrate the preemptive strategic use of the international law system as 
evidenced in this article. After applying these various definitions to the sce-
narios presented following this introduction, it became evident that lawfare, 
at least as deployed by the Soviet Union, was primarily a supplement to 
military strategy and was used with a strategic intent and political motiva-
tion to manipulate the legal system, international bodies and other states.  
A.  The Soviet Era 
Grigorii Ivanovich Tunkin, in a paper presented at the III Anglo-
Soviet Symposium on Public International Law held at the University of 
London on March 20 through 22, 1989, summed up the Soviet interpretation 
of international law. ―The creation of norms of international law is the 
process of bringing the wills of States into concordance. The content of the 
will of a State is its international legal position, which constitutes part of the 
  
 12 PETER KENEZ, THE BIRTH OF THE PROPAGANDA STATE: SOVIET METHODS OF MASS 
MOBILIZATION, 1917–1929 4  (Cambridge University Press) (1985). 
 13 Craig H. Allen, Command of the Commons Boasts: An Invitation to Lawfare, 83 Int‘l L. 
Stud. Ser. U.S. Naval War Coll. 30, 49 (2007) (noting at the 2006 Naval War College Inter-
national Law Department conference on Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Com-
mons, Strategic Communications, and Natural Disasters that concern for lawfare had found 
its way into U.S. National Defense Strategy, he laid out a possible asymmetric scenario 
where a much less powerful state utilized the U.N. General Assembly to restrict access to, in 
his scenario, control of the sea, which had been claimed by a more powerful state. This tactic 
could be used whether the less powerful state had a legitimate claim or, as in his scenario, 
was used as a legal ―pushback‖ in response to a public assertion by the more powerful state 
regarding its command of the sea). 
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foreign policy position of the State. In the course of forming new norms of 
international law there occurs the bringing into concordance of the interna-
tional legal positions of States, bringing their wills into concordance relative 
to the content of rules of behavior and recognizing them to be legally bind-
ing.‖ 14 Tunkin went on to remind us that international law served as a 
means to program the behavior of states. It made up a ―normative system 
making it possible to foresee the reaction of other actors in the inter-States 
system to particular actions of a State.‖15 
A primary tool of the Soviet Union to control the behavior of these 
states was the treaty. The progenitor of this form of lawfare as it concerns 
aggression and aggressive war is the definition put forth by Maxim Max-
imovich Litvinov at the 1933 Conference for the Reduction and Limitation 
of Armaments. The definition declared the aggressor as the state that was 
first to declare war, invade via armed forces, bomb, or blockade another 
state. Specifically, it described situations that could not be used as justifica-
tion: the internal situation of a given state, which included political or eco-
nomic issues, alleged mal-administration, danger to foreign residents, revo-
lutionary or counter-revolutionary movements, strikes, or the establishment 
or maintenance of a political, economic or social order.  
Both preceding and subsequent to this the Soviet Union negotiated 
several non-aggression treaties with neighboring states. The treaty with Fin-
land, signed January 21, 1932, contained language forbidding aggressive 
action against each other. It also restricted either party from becoming a 
party to a treaty hostile to the other. The treaty with Latvia, signed February 
5, 1932, also contained these prohibitions, but further codified that neither 
state was to take part in treaties aimed at economic or financial boycott 
against the other. The pact of non-aggression with Poland, signed July 25, 
1932, further added that should one of the parties be attacked by a third 
state, the other party to the treaty agrees not to aid the aggressor or become 
party to an agreement openly hostile to the other. The most prevalent and 
often citied treaty culminated in London in 1933.  
The Convention for the Definition of Aggression was signed in 
London on July 3, 1933. The Soviet Union joined Romania, Afghanistan, 
Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, and Turkey in an agreement that read in 
part: 
Article II. 
Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject 
to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered 
to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions: 
 
  
 14 G.I. TUNKIN, On the Primacy of International Law in Politics, in PERESTROIKA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5–6 (William E. Butler ed.,1990). 
 15 Id. at 7. 
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(1) Declaration of war upon another State; 
(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of 
war, of the territory of another State; 
(3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declara-
tion of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State; 
(4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State; 
(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory 
which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstand-
ing the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the 
measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection. 
 
Article III. 
No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve 
as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article II. (For 
examples, see Annex.) 
 
Article IV. 
The present Convention shall be ratified by each of the High Con-
tracting Parties in accordance with its laws.16 
 
This Convention includes the following Annex: 
 
ANNEX TO ARTICLE III OF THE CONVENTION RELATING 
TO THE DEFINITION of AGGRESSION. 
The High Contracting Parties signatories of the Convention relating 
to the definition of aggression, 
Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity 
of the rule laid down in Article III of that Convention shall be in no way 
restricted, to furnish certain indications for determining the aggressor, 
Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article II of 
that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among 
others: 
A. The internal condition of a State: e.g., its political, economic or 
social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to 
strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war. 
B. The international conduct of a State: e.g., the violation or threat-
ened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State 
or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic 
or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic, financial or other obli-
  
 16 Convention for the Definition of Aggression, July 3, 1933, 147 L.N.T.S. 67. See also 
148 L.N.T.S. 211 and 148 L.N.T.S. 79. The Convention was signed by Maxim Litvinov on 
the same date with subsequent ratifications by all parties and accession by Finland January 
31, 1934. 
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gations towards foreign States; frontier incidents not forming any of the 
cases of aggression specified in Article II. 
The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognise that the 
present Convention can never legitimate any violations of international law 
that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.17 
The treaties themselves were intentionally crafted to provide a 
measure of predictability to the actions of the other countries. Specifically, 
non-aggression treaties with the surrounding countries of Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Poland, and most notably, Finland, were implemented not so 
much to influence those countries‘ actions as they applied to the Soviet Un-
ion, but to provide a barrier against the Germans, British, and French.18 Not 
knowing how the tide would turn during the lead-up to the Second World 
War, the Soviet Government hedged its bets. The most blatant example of 
this was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.19 Whether one believes it was a cun-
ning plan on Stalin‘s part or extreme naiveté, it certainly appears to continue 
to follow the trend put in place in the 1930s by the Soviets of penning these 
treaties in an attempt to control the surrounding territories and allow itself 
time to build its military forces.  
Immediately after Red Army troops answered the German invasion 
of Poland in September of 1939, declaring it a collapsed government, Fin-
land became the next state with a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union 
to see it violated by the Red Army during the Winter War from November 
  
 17 Id.  
 18 For further study on this period of collective security, see also JIRÍ HOCHMAN, THE 
SOVIET UNION AND THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 1934––1938, Cornell Studies in 
Security Affairs. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); JONATHAN HASLAM, THE SOVIET 
UNION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE, 1933-39 (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1984) Hochman noted that the reason the Soviet Union entered these treaties 
was to ―enmesh expansionist Germany in a web of multilateral guarantees and, failing this, 
the creation of an alliance system to contain Hitler‘s wild ambitions.‖ Id. at 2. He also ex-
plained that many of the treaties signed by the Soviets at the time, particularly the initial 
peace treaties of 1920, were primarily a means of creating a pause.  Id. at 15. The general 
task of Soviet foreign policy of this time was to secure safe external conditions in order to 
facilitate Stalin‘s policies to remodel Russia. Id. at 172. The primary goals were to prevent 
formation of a hostile combination of foreign powers and to keep the Soviet Union out of 
international conflict while she was growing militarily. Hochman contends that the Soviet 
Union‘s special relationship with Germany was the main focus of this policy until 1934 and 
that the international conventions and protocols were not a preparatory step in another direc-
tion but to further promote foreign recognition and improve advantages drawn from foreign 
trade.  Id. at 16 & 28. Russians, with several non-aggression pacts, specifically that with 
Poland, sought consent from Berlin before finalizing them. Id at 35. In summary, Hochman 
was critical overall of the Soviet policy during this period and questioned if the desire for 
collective security was truly the goal. Id.  
 19 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, Aug. 23, 1939, Germany-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, at 76–77 (Raymond J. Sontag & James S. Beddie eds., 
1948). 
File: Bartman 2 Created on:  11/28/2010 7:09:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 7:58:00 PM 
432 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. [Vol. 43:423 
30, 1939 to March 13, 1940.When the Finnish Government refused to nego-
tiate terms that the Soviet Government thought necessary to secure their 
defense against possible invasion, the Red Army moved in. The result was 
the first time the League of Nations branded a state the aggressor. The Re-
port of the Assembly outlined a list of the treaties to which both states were 
a party, primarily, the Pact of Paris of 1928, the Convention for the Defini-
tion of Aggression to which Finland acceded in 1934, the Treaty of Non-
aggression and Pacific Settlement of Disputes concluded between Finland 
and the U.S.S.R. in 1932 and extended until 1945, and the Covenant of the 
League of Nations.20 The Special Committee noted that the original request 
for Finland to cede territory was a violation of the Non-aggression Treaty of 
1932 and the Pact of Paris, which set the territories of each as inviolable.21 It 
went on to note the definition of aggression that was applied to this instance 
was that which was codified in Articles I, II, and III of the Convention for 
the Definition of Aggression signed at London on  July 3, 1933.22 Specifi-
cally, it found ―Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are 
bound by the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed at London 
on July 3, 1933. According to Article II of this Convention, the aggressor in 
an armed conflict shall be considered to be that State which is the first to 
invade by its armed forces, with or without declaration of war, the territory 
of another State or to attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without 
declaration of war, the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State.‖ It 
stated further that under the terms of Article III, no political, military, eco-
nomic, or other consideration may serve as an excuse or justification for this 
aggression. ―The order to enter Finland was given to the Soviet troops on 
the ground of ‗further armed provocation‘. The reference was to frontier 
incidents or alleged frontier incidents. In the Annex, however, to Article II 
of the Convention, it is declared that no act of aggression within the mean-
ing of Article II of the Convention can be justified by frontier incidents not 
forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article II.‖23 The Report 
went on to note that the Government of Finland recognized by the League 
was freely elected and based on respect for democratic agreements. The 
Soviet Government could not create a ―so-called‖ government, either de 
jure or de facto, and regard it as the Government of Finland, thus justifying 
its action under Article 15 of the Covenant.24 The Special Committee then 
  
 20 See Report of the Assembly, provided for in art. 15, paras. 4, 10 of the Covenant, sub-
mitted by the Special Committee of the Assembly, 20 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 531, 532–33, 
535 (1939), reprinted in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION, 70 
(1975). 
 21 Id. at 537, para. 5. 
 22 Id. at para. 7. 
 23 Id. at 539, para 6. 
 24 Id. at 540, para 7. 
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resolved to condemn the action taken by the U.S.S.R. against Finland, re-
sulting in expulsion of the U.S.S.R. on December 14, 1939.  
Contrary to placing the Soviet Union in a less favorable position, 
less than a year later the Soviet Union ended up with what it sought at the 
beginning. On March 12, 1940, the Moscow Peace Treaty was signed be-
tween the U.S.S.R. and Finland. As part of the peace treaty, the Karelian 
Isthmus and the city of Vyborg were ceded to the Soviet Union, along with 
the lease of the Hanko Peninsula. The Soviet Union, though formally la-
beled the aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations, ended up with 
what they wanted initially, possibly re-enforcing a valuable lesson in the art 
of lawfare. On the one hand, the determination of the Soviet Union as the 
aggressor clearly stated the actions taken which placed it in that category. 
On the other hand, however, with no enforcement mechanism, the label 
proved inconsequential to the Soviet Union. Instructive in this scenario is 
the justification put forth by the Soviet Union; self-defense of Leningrad 
and a ―request‖ by the ―government‖ of Finland, as well as the use of a non-
aggression treaty in the first place. This scenario will be played out again 
and again by the Soviet Union in an attempt to manipulate the international 
legal system on both the front end with a nonaggression treaty and the back 
end with justification for military intervention.  
Undaunted, the Soviet Union took the lead in the next phase of the 
use of the definition of aggression, this time against the individual. The tar-
get was the Nazi leadership at the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg, also referred to as  the Nuremberg Trial, from November 14, 1945 to 
October 1, 1946. Years prior to the trial at Nuremberg, the Soviets set the 
stage through domestic prosecution. The Soviet Union held trials in Kras-
nodar, Khar‘kov, Briansk, Leningrad, Riga, Minsk, and other venues from 
1943 to the early 1950s. These trials served as ―the original introduction to 
the Nuremberg Trial, paving the way for the application and effectuation of 
many norms and principles which later constituted the basis of Nuremberg 
Law.‖25 Though not defined, aggression and aggressive war were elements 
of the charge of Crimes Against Peace as detailed below: 
(a) Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international trea-
ties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or Con-
spiracy.26 
  
 25 Irina Andreevna Lediakh, The Application of the Nuremberg Principles by Other Mili-
tary Tribunals and National Courts, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
263 (George Ginsburgs & V. N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990).  
 26 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, II. Jurisdiction and General Prin-
ciples. Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 11 (AMS Press 1971) (1947). 
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Justice Robert Jackson, in his opening statement, addressed the 
weakness of the lack of a definition for a war of aggression. He stated di-
rectly that the reason the lack of a definition was not a problem was because 
of the firmly established international law in the Convention for the Defini-
tion of Aggression signed by the Soviet Union and seven other states. Based 
on this Convention, he suggested that the  
‗aggressor‘ should generally be held to be that state which is the 
first to commit any of the following actions: 
1) Declaration of war upon another state; 
2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of 
war, of the territory of another state; 
3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a decla-
ration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another state; and 
4) Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of 
another state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to 
take in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands 
of all assistance or protection.27 
He went on to add ―that no political, military, economic, or other 
considerations shall serve as an excuse or justification for such actions; but 
exercise of the right of legitimate self-defense, that is to say, resistance to an 
act of aggression, or action to assist a state which has been subjected to ag-
gression, shall not constitute a war of aggression.‖28 This incorporated the 
previous Soviet definition in its full form to be used as the test to determine 
if the wars begun by the Nazi leaders were ―unambiguously aggressive.‖29 
As a result, not only was the individual charge of Crimes Against Peace 
codified, the stature of Soviet influence on international law took a leap 
forward.  
Though the coordination between the U.S. and Soviet jurists at Nu-
remberg was generally good, the Cold War placed them at odds. The Ko-
rean War (June 25, 1950–July 27, 1953) was the first and most blatant in-
stance of the Soviet use of lawfare to generate propaganda against an oppo-
nent. Initially, the Soviet Government took aim at the U.N. Security Council 
that had allowed the ―police action‖ into what they termed an internal con-
flict in their absence. The Soviet Union continued its efforts to declare the 
United States the aggressor for interfering in internal affairs of a state in the 
world media. As we see by the rhetoric both at home and abroad, through 
international political bodies and public propaganda, the Soviet Union 
worked exhaustively to place the face of the aggressor on the United States. 
By utilizing both the definition proposed for the state by earlier treaties and 
the definition proposed for the individual at Nuremberg, the Soviet Union 
  
 27 Id. at 148. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
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repeatedly placed the terms of aggression and aggressive war onto the world 
stage to undermine the actions of a major opponent, the United States. 
Phrases such as intervention into the internal affairs of another country, 
action in disregard of the obligations of the United States to the UN, inva-
sion by armed naval and air forces, and planning, preparing and carrying out 
hostile acts, were repeated often by the Soviet Union to clearly place the 
United States in violation of the current public definition, even if it was not 
a strictly legal one.  
During this period the definition remained consistent, it was the fre-
quency with which it was espoused that increased. Still we see the combina-
tion of lawfare and propaganda as a weapon, in lieu of major military com-
mitment, used to discredit an opponent. However, possibly more to the fu-
ture understanding of how lawfare can be technically manipulated to one‘s 
advantage was the Soviet deliberation regarding the initial advice to North 
Korea not to invade. The Soviet Government looked not only at North Ko-
rea‘s military readiness but at the ramifications of U.S. involvement. We 
will see this type of deliberation again regarding Hungary and Czechoslo-
vakia. Another feature of these deliberations was a description of what the 
Soviet Government was looking for in a state that would justify interven-
tion. It would need partisan movements, liberated districts and people will-
ing to participate in an armed uprising. The Soviet Government would also 
seek this situation in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, not only in order to in-
crease the odds of success, but also to provide justification for actions that 
fall directly under the definition of aggression and aggressive war.  
Despite the propaganda and lawfare practiced in the early 1950s, in 
1956 the Soviet Union used the treaty it signed with Hungary and the War-
saw Pact as justification to intervene to keep a political regime in place and 
quell an internal revolution, both clearly codified by the Soviet Government 
as reasons that do not amount to justification for aggression. The Soviet 
Government used the Warsaw Pact as justification to say that its troops 
were allowed to be used for collective defense at the request of the Hunga-
rian Government on October 23, 1956.  
It is important to look at the full explanation for the invasion be-
cause it gives justification for the actions of the Soviet Government from 
their perspective. It shows that they were concerned that the events in Hun-
gary not spread to other Warsaw Pact countries. Having just allowed Poland 
a bit of latitude in handling their workers‘ rebellion, the spread might estab-
lish a trend they did not want to start. Soviet leader Nikita Sergeevich 
Khrushchev also expressed concern with the international situation. Initially 
Khrushchev explained that the Soviet military had been asked to intervene 
by the Hungarian Government. He then finally expressed concern that the 
Americans not be given an opportunity to approach Russian borders. Taken 
together, the reason given to intervene, an invitation, with the reasons given 
above, demonstrate that the Soviet Government made a calculated effort to 
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manipulate the circumstances that preceded the intervention while having 
previously taken advantage of the control that the original nonaggression 
agreement provided.  
The matter was brought to the attention of the General Assembly on 
December 12, 1956. General Assembly Resolution 1131 (XI) declared that 
―by using its armed force against the Hungarian people, the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is violating the political indepen-
dence of Hungary.‖30 Resolution 1132 (XI) recommended a Special Com-
mittee be formed to study this problem.31 
In the Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary 
to the U.N. General Assembly, Eleventh Session in 1957, the Committee 
gave their findings on the situation created by the intervention of the 
U.S.S.R. in the internal affairs of Hungary.32 It appeared, the Committee 
noted, that although the whole uprising was spontaneous, the Soviet military 
had taken steps in as early as October to plan for armed intervention in case 
of an uprising.33 No clause in the Warsaw Pact provided for Soviet military 
intervention due to political developments within a signatory state.34 Fur-
ther, it was still uncertain as to who issued the request to the Soviet authori-
ties to assist to stop the uprising and to its legal validity.35   
An international group of jurists that advised the Committee sug-
gested that Soviet action in Hungary ―would probably be open to condem-
nation under the Soviet Government‘s own definition of aggression.‖36 It 
referenced the U.S.S.R.‘s submission to the United Nations 1956 Special 
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, specifically, the lan-
guage that the state was the aggressor which first invaded ―by its armed 
forces, even without a declaration of war,  the territory of another 
State.‖37 Further, ―[a] State would be declared to have committed an act of 
aggression if it ‗promotes an internal upheaval in another State or a change 
of policy in favor of the aggressor.‘‖38 It went on to state, as we have seen 
many times before submitted by the Soviet Government, that the internal 
situation of the state such as revolutionary or counter-revolutionary move-
  
 30 G.A. Res. 1131 (XI), U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/1131 (Dec. 12, 1956).  
 31 G.A. Res. 1132 (XI), U.N. GAOR, 11th  Sess., U.N. Doc. A/1132 (Jan. 10, 1957). 
 32 Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, U.N. Doc. A/3592; GA, 
11th  Sess., Supp. No. 18 (1957).    
 33 Id. at 245. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 246. 
 36 Id. at 99, para. 324. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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ments, disorder or strikes, or establishment or maintenance of any political, 
economic, or social system were not justification.39 
The Committee concluded that the reason for the Soviet interven-
tion was to ―save a political regime, and retain a military ally within its area 
of economic dominance.‖40 The Soviet Union had done this during the pe-
riod from October 29 to November 4 via a definite plan for conquest and 
military subjugation of Hungary by the Soviet military.41 Notice the lan-
guage of ―a definite plan.‖ Not only did the Committee note the violation of 
the state definition of aggression, it also implicated the individual participa-
tion in the act of aggression from Nuremberg. The lessons learned in Fin-
land were reinforced in Hungary, however. Despite the general consensus 
that the Soviet Union‘s actions were aggressive, the Security Council veto 
allowed it to stay clear of that body and the General Assembly was unable 
to put action behind its resolution. The communist party was restored in 
Hungary and its alliance to the Warsaw Pact confirmed. 
Czechoslovakia saw the same reaction on August 20, 1968 when it 
attempted to implement a series of reforms during the Prague Spring. In 
violation of the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Cze-
choslovakia signed on July 4, 1933 and the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union 
again tried to couch the invasion in terms of an invitation by the Czech 
Government. This led to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which gave a name to the 
policy of intervention when a socialist country attempted to leave the fold.  
The Vietnam War, fought 1959–1975, was another example of li-
mited Soviet military involvement  and huge Soviet use of propaganda 
branding its opponent the aggressor for intervening in the internal affairs of 
another state. Of primary importance during this period for our purposes, 
was the December 14, 1974 adoption of General Assembly Resolution 3314 
(XXIX), defining aggression. It adopted the London Convention language 
to a large part, listing the acts that qualify as aggression and those that do 
not qualify as justification for aggression. Unfortunately, as a resolution it 
did not have the force of law.  
Article 3 of General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of Decem-
ber 14, 1974 on the Definition of Aggression, with Special Regard to Indi-
rect Aggression reads: 
  
 39 Id. The conference took place on March 2, 1957 and was headed by Sir Hawtley Shaw-
cross of Nuremburg fame.  For the conference publication, see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION 
OF JURISTS (1952– ), THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND THE RULE OF LAW (1st ed. 1957).  Doc-
uments were presented, however, arguing the opposite as well.  In an interview on Legal 
Aspects of Soviet Intervention, G.P. Zadorozhnyi noted that the Soviet forces were there 
legally and at the request of the Hungarian regimes of Nagy and Kádár.  He went on to say 
that Nagy‘s regime could not annul the Warsaw Pact, only the state body that ratified it 
could. 
 40 Report of the Special Committee on the Problem, supra note 32, at 99. 
 41 Id. at 67. 
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Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, 
subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an 
act of aggression; 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the terri-
tory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, result-
ing from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of 
the territory of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territo-
ry of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory 
of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed 
forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the terri-
tory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contra-
vention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of 
their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed 
at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrat-
ing an act of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its 
substantial involvement therein.42 
Article 5 reads: 
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, econom-
ic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression. 
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Ag-
gression gives rise to international responsibility. 
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from ag-
gression is or shall be recognized as lawful. 43 
Julius Stone analyzed General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX). 
He countered the notion that claims were being made that the Soviet theme 
of depriving a potential aggressor of ―loopholes and pretexts to unleash ag-
gression‖ had been accomplished with this ―consensus definition.‖44 He 
refuted those claims with a host of reasons why the text actually ―codified 
  
 42 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 
1974), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 224 (1977). 
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into itself‖ all these loopholes.45 He made the point that any resolution of 
the General Assembly was impotent because of its inability to impose legal 
obligations over and above those already in the Charter or other treaties. 
Because of differing state interpretations of the language of the resolution, 
―we face the paradox that the closing off of ‗loopholes‘ and ‗pretexts‘ hailed 
by the Soviet Union as the great achievement is precisely what the defini-
tion did not achieve.‖46  
The weakened position of the United States after the Vietnam War 
combined with a strong belief in the Brezhnev Doctrine and culminated in 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. A treaty of 
Friendship, Good-neighborliness and Cooperation was signedbetween the 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan December  1978. It contained the now famil-
iar language of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
noninterference in internal affairs, as well as agreements to fight aggression 
and support a just struggle of the people.47 This was another example of the 
intentional use of lawfare to support follow-on warfare. Henry S. Bradsher48 
reaffirmed that prior to this invasion, the Soviet Government was looking 
for a cover story. Specifically, they needed a small group of Afghans 
clothed in a claim of legitimacy, who would move against the current presi-
dent and request ―Soviet help as a legal response to a treaty obligation.‖49 
Bradsher, as this study does, drew parallels to Finland, Hungary, and Cze-
choslovakia.  
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov opened the Politburo session on 
March 18, 1979 with a summary of the situation in Afghanistan. The fol-
lowing exchange addressed the Politburo‘s concern regarding military force 
in Afghanistan and international opinion: 
ANDROPOV. Comrades, I have considered all these issues in depth 
and arrived at the conclusion that we must consider very, very seriously, the 
question of whose cause we will be supporting if we deploy forces into 
Afghanistan. It's completely clear to us that Afghanistan is not ready at this 
time to resolve all of the issues it faces through socialism. The economy is 
backward, the Islamic religion predominates, and nearly all of the rural 
population is illiterate. We know Lenin's teaching about a revolutionary 
situation. Whatever situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not 
  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 225. See also JULIUS STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS: UNITED NATIONS 
APPROACHES TO AGGRESSION (1977). 
 47 Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation, USSR-Afg., Dec. 5, 
1978. 
 48 Henry S. Bradsher was the Associated Press bureau chief in Moscow from 1964–68. He 
worked in Afghanistan as an Associated Press correspondent in the early 1960s, visiting the 
country again in the 1970s for the Washington Star.  He has also published in the Economist , 
Foreign Affairs and other publications.  
 49 HENRY S. BRADSHER, AFGHAN COMMUNISM AND SOVIET INTERVENTION 93 (1999). 
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that type of situation. Therefore, I believe that we can suppress a revolution 
in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and that is for us entirely 
inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk. 
KOSYGIN.50 Maybe we ought to instruct our ambassador, Comrade 
Vinogradov, to go to Prime Minister of Iran [Mehdi] Bazargan and inform 
him that interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan cannot be tole-
rated. 
GROMYKO.51 I completely support Comrade Andropov's proposal 
to rule out such a measure as the deployment of our troops into Afghanistan. 
The army there is unreliable. Thus our army, when it arrives in Afghanistan, 
will be the aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the Afghan 
people first of all, and it will have to shoot at them. Comrade Andropov 
correctly noted that indeed the situation in Afghanistan is not ripe for a rev-
olution. And all that we have done in recent years with such effort in terms 
of detente, arms reduction, and much more—all that would be thrown back. 
China, of course, would be given a nice present. All the nonaligned coun-
tries will be against us. In a word, serious consequences are to be expected 
from such an action. There will no longer be any question of a meeting of 
Leonid Ilych with Carter, and the visit of [French President] Giscard d'Es-
tang at the end of March will be placed in question. One must ask, and what 
would we gain? Afghanistan with its present government, with a backward 
economy, with inconsequential weight in international affairs. On the other 
side, we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view too we would not 
be justified in sending troops. According to the U.N. Charter a country can 
appeal for assistance, and we could send troops, in case it is subject to ex-
ternal aggression. Afghanistan has not been subject to any aggression. This 
is its internal affair, a revolutionary internal conflict, a battle of one group of 
the population against another. Incidentally, the Afghans haven't officially 
addressed us on bringing in troops. In a word, we now find ourselves in a 
situation where the leadership of the country, as a result of the serious mis-
takes it has allowed to occur, has ended up not on the high ground, not in 
command of the necessary support from the people.52 
An excerpt from Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko further clarified 
the understanding that they were violating their own definition of aggres-
sion. He stated, ―[i]f we introduce troops and beat down the Afghan people 
  
 50 Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin, Member of Soviet Union Politburo, Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan (Mar. 17, 
1979) (transcript available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409& 
fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034DBB8-96B6 175C9823CBCE6162CEDA 
&sort=Collection&item=Soviet%20Invasion%20of%20Afghanistan). 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id. 
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then we will be accused of aggression for sure. There‘s no getting around it 
here.‖53 
Andropov, Gromyko, and Chernenko clearly discussed their under-
standing of armed intervention and its predicted international reprisals. The 
Soviet Government was very adept at manipulating the concept of aggres-
sion by this time and here we see the thought process clearly.  
Of particular relevance in the above exchange was the emphasis of 
relations being based on the U.N. Charter. Again, though, despite this treaty 
and the reasoned arguments otherwise, the Soviets invaded. In opposition to 
the logical reasoning against invasion outlined above, the public justifica-
tion for invasion defended their ultimate actions: 
Thus, the intervention from without and the terror unleashed by Amin 
within the country have actually now created a threat to liquidate what the 
April Revolution brought Afghanistan. … Considering all this and the re-
quest of the new Afghan leadership for aid and assistance in repelling for-
eign aggression, the Soviet Union, guided by its international duty, has de-
cided to send limited Soviet military contingents to Afghanistan which 
will be withdrawn from there after the reasons which occasioned the ne-
cessity of this action disappear. In undertaking this temporary forced ac-
tion we are explaining to all governments with whom the Soviet Union 
maintains diplomatic relations that are responding to the request of the 
newly formed leadership of the government of Afghanistan which turned 
to the Soviet Union for aid and assistance in a struggle against foreign ag-
gression. The Soviet Union thereby is proceeding from a commonality of 
interests of Afghanistan and our country in issues of security recorded in 
the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation and 
the interests of maintaining peace in this region. The favorable reaction of 
the Soviet Union to this request of the leadership of Afghanistan also 
proceeds from the provision of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter stipulating 
the inherent right of countries to collective and individual self-defense in 
order to repel aggression and restore peace.
54
 
Note the familiar terminology—struggle against foreign aggression, 
reference to a treaty and the U.N. Charter, and self-defense. The Soviet Un-
ion continued to couch its position in the terms of lawfare that were accept-
able, that they were the aggressor notwithstanding. The Afghanistan war did 
not go as the others had and the troops withdrew in 1989 without gaining a 
firm hold on the government or policies of Afghanistan. Although the Unit-
ed Nations considered the actions on many occasions, there was no formal 
designation of aggression against the Soviet Union. 
  
 53 Id.  
 54 Politburo Decree, Central Committee of the Communist Party, 1979, 
P177/151(Ru.)(regarding the placement of military detachments in Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union). 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union and establishment of the Russian 
Federation redirected attention inward. Using the logic that Chechnya was 
part of the Russian Federation, therefore something to be handled internally, 
troops moved in on December 1, 1994. The first Russian intervention into 
Chechnya lasted almost two years. The invasion of Chechnya, like that of 
Korea and Afghanistan, occurred after much dissention within the Politburo 
and the Department of Defense. As with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 
where there was concern that they would leave the Warsaw Pact, there was 
a concern that Chechnya would secede. And, as with Afghanistan, despite 
denunciation by the international community, Russia‘s internal economic 
and political situation would ultimately drive their decision to pull out. 
B.  The Russian Federation Era 
The 1994–1996 conflict, generally known as the First Chechen 
War, though outwardly appearing similar to Russia‘s invasion of Hungary 
or Afghanistan, was labeled by the Russian Federation and the world as an 
―internal‖ matter, not an international event falling under the definition of 
aggression. It was cited by the United Nations as a violation of human rights 
and humanitarian law.55 This introduced the beginning of a subtle shift away 
from a focus on aggression to a focus on humanitarian issues. It has yet to 
be determined if this shift will continue or revert back to the language of 
aggression and aggressive war now that a consensus definition is available. 
Its success will hinge, however, on the ability to enforce the definition. If 
enforceability and public opinion favor the humanitarian language, focus 
may continue to shift that way. 
Over this same period, the definition of aggression was being con-
sidered in documentation both internationally and domestically. The Draft 
Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind was finally adopted 
by the International Law Committee (ILC) and submitted to the General 
Assembly in 1996. The Russian Federation adopted a new Constitution in 
1993 and a new Criminal Code in 1996, containing expanded application of 
international law, and in the case of the Criminal Code, a specific listing of 
the crime of aggression.  
Following major national upheaval, the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation was adopted by national referendum on December 12, 1993 (he-
reafter the 1993 Constitution).56 It provided increased presidential and judi-
  
 55 Commission on Human Rights Res. 2001/24, Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of 
the Russian Federation  57th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/L.24 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
 56 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 25, 1993 
(Russ.).  See also George Ginsburgs, The Struggle for Law in Post-Soviet Russia,  in 
WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION 53   (András Sajó ed. 1996).  Ginsburgs 
noted that in Article 2, a person‘s rights and freedoms were of supreme value. He saw this as 
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cial powers among many other pertinent areas, but for our purposes, the 
most important was incorporation of international law. Article 15(4) of the 
1993 Constitution stated that international law and international treaties 
made up an integral part of the Russian legal system. It further stated, ―if an 
international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules other than 
those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall ap-
ply.‖57  
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (hereafter 1996 Crim-
inal Code), which took effect on January 1, 1997, produced changes in the 
new version as well.58 The specific reference to aggression and aggressive 
war in the Criminal Code read as follows: 
 
Article 353. Planning, Preparing, Unleashing, or Waging an Ag-
gressive War 
1. Planning, preparing, or unleashing an aggressive war shall be 
punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of seven to fifteen years. 
2.   Waging an aggressive war shall be punishable by deprivation of 
liberty for a term of 10 to 20 years. 
 
Article 354 Public Appeals to Unleash an Aggressive War 
1.    Public appeals to unleash an aggressive war shall be punishable 
by a fine in the amount of 500 to 700 minimum wages, or in the amount of 
the wage or salary, or any other income of the convicted person for a period 
of a five to seven months, or by deprivation of liberty for a term of up to 
three years. 
2.     The same deeds, committed with the use of the mass media or 
by a person who holds a state post of the Russian Federation or a state post 
of a subject of the Russian Federation, shall be punishable by a fine in the 
amount of 700 to 1,000 minimum wages, or in the amount of the wage or 
salary, or any other income of the convicted person for a period of seven to 
twelve months, or by deprivation of liberty for a term of two to five years, 
with disqualification to hold specified offices or to engage in specified ac-
tivities for a term of up to three years.59 
  
a change in thought from the state being higher than the law, to the law being higher than the 
state. 
 57 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 25, 1999, art. 
15(4) (Russ.).   
 58 Anatolyi V. Naumov, The New Russian Criminal Code as a Reflection of Ongoing 
Reforms, 8 CRIM. L. F. 191, 192 (1997).  
 59 UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIIKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 353–354 
(Ru.), available at http://www.russian-criminal-code.com/PartII/SectionXII/Chapter34.html. 
Interestingly, however, article 353 does not seem to determine who can be prosecuted. Ar-
ticle 354 states that if the crime is performed by a person holding a state post in the Russian 
Federation, they will be held accountable in such a way. Article 353 shows no such restric-
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Having incorporated international law into its national law, regard-
ing the crime of aggression, complementarity applies. Complementarity, in 
this case, refers to the concept that allows state jurisdiction over a crime that 
is listed in the Rome Statute, such as Crimes Against Peace, unless the state 
is unable or unwilling to proceed or is conducting the investigation in bad 
faith.60 
The Russian Federation has already spoken on this issue by adop-
tion of the crime of aggression into its national law. The general nature of 
the definition allows it to define the crime and thus the causation and lea-
dership question as it see fit. This places the Russian Federation in a posi-
tion to argue that it is able and willing to proceed in the investigation of a 
crime under the Rome Statute so as not to fall under its jurisdiction. The 
Russian Federation took a page out of the Soviet playbook. This preemptive 
inclusion positioned it to take full advantage of international law, once 
again. It could also lead to a number of the problems Pål Wrange outlined in 
the Turin report, particularly shielding a potential leader from prosecution 
and basing their jurisdiction not solely on state boundaries but allowing for 
territorial or security issues to make national law applicable to a broader 
audience.61  
The Soviet approach to defining aggression has changed little since 
1933, and as Robert M. Cassidy found, the ―Soviet and Russian Federation 
forces exhibited more continuity than change‖ as well.62 These premises 
confirm the consistent, continuous, and calculated use of international law, 
and particularly treaties, as a form of asymmetrical lawfare used to manipu-
  
tion. Also under this section, the Code lists manufacturing and dissemination of weapons of 
mass destruction, use of prohibited means or methods of conducting warfare, genocide, eco-
cide, use of mercenaries, and attacks on persons or institutions under international protection 
as crimes against peace and security of mankind. 
 60 For a more thorough study of the concept of complementarity, see Assembly of States 
Parties, International Criminal Court, Nov. 30, 2007–Dec. 14, 2007, ICC-ASP/6/INF.2, 6th 
Sess (Aug. 21, 2007).  See also Astrid REISINGER, National Legislation on Individual Re-
sponsibility for Conduct Amounting to Aggression, in CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55, (May 14, 2007–May 18, 2007); PAL WRANGE, The Principle of Com-
plementarity Under the Rome Statute and its Interplay With the Crime of Aggression, in 
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 57 (May 14, 2007–May 18, 2007); Com-
plementarity, RC/Res.1, I.C.C. Doc. RC/Res.1 (June 8, 2010). 
 61 WRANGE, supra note 60, at 37. 
 62 For another review of the period of the 1920s through 1969, see William E. Butler, 
Soviet Concepts of Aggression, in A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 1 
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 182–197 (M. Cherif Bassiouni and Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973). 
ROBERT M. CASSIDY, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and 
the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict 50 (2003) (noting that the same officer that com-
manded the invasion of Czechoslovakia led the initial invasion of Afghanistan. Cassidy‘s 
premise was that the Russian forces failed to adapt to a different type of warfare from the 
Soviet period into the later years). 
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late or exploit the international legal system to supplement military and po-
litical objectives from 1933 to the present.  
Though the excuse to support interventions to suppress counter-
revolution in other socialist countries no longer exists, the primary reasons 
used during Soviet times such as an invitation by the government, self-
determination of a nation‘s people, and self-defense are still viable today. 
The Russian Federation, as did the Soviet Union, continues to use the inter-
national system to their advantage, particularly by positioning itself at the 
forefront of defining aggressive war, both internally and through interna-
tional bodies.  
Given the new definition of aggression recently amended to the 
Rome Statue, there is hope that a consensus definition will put an end to the 
wars of aggression. However, the International Criminal Court will not be 
able to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime until after January 1, 2017 
when a decision is to be made by States Parties to activate the jurisdiction. 
Until that time, it will be no more relevant than General Assembly Resolu-
tion 3314 (XXIX). The ability of the Security Council to refer an act of ag-
gression to the Court is a step in the right direction but the veto has been 
used in the past to circumvent this effort. The ability of the Prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation on his own is a positive step as well. The inability to 
prosecute non-State Parties or their nationals will continue to limit the ap-
plicability of the definition.  
In order to preclude further actions, such as the ones demonstrated 
by the Soviet Union time and again, enforcement will be the key. Without 
solid enforcement mechanisms, this case study is only a demonstration of 
the weakness of the system. The lessons learned from the Soviet experience 
of the use of the definition of aggression as a form of lawfare should be 
considered by all as the discussions continue on the application and the ex-
ecution of the definition. And, as for the concept of lawfare as applied 
through the use of the definition of aggression, one need only look to the 
Soviet Union to see the successful use of an old concept with a new name. 
 
